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Abstract
Knowledge-based authentication (KBA) has gained prominence in electronic commerce 
applications, as a primary and secondary user authentication method. Our prior 
research investigated the application of statistical modeling, specifically Bayesian 
networks, to theorize the KBA problem and to develop entropy-based metrics along with 
closed-form solutions to estimating the associated parameters. This paper reports the 
results of our empirical research work to extend these analytical models to the 
behavioral and social dimensions of KBA involving both legitimate users and attackers.
The objective of this empirical investigation is twofold. First, we conducted an
exploratory study to gain new insights into user perceptions and preferences 
corresponding to the KBA criterion space and tradeoffs among the criteria. This helped
to collectively determine the goodness of a KBA system measured by variables such as 
security, convenience and privacy. Second, our confirmatory experiments attempted to 
validate the hypothesis that the proposed Bayesian model makes a sensible 
approximation to the human cognitive process underlying the KBA problem. The study 
also produced serendipitous findings such as: (1) how attackers might exploit the
acquired knowledge about factoid distributions and dependencies to conduct their 
malicious attacks; and (2) the security and privacy concerns associated with information 
disclosure on the Internet, specifically in social networking sites. Besides contributing to 
the research literature, we expect the findings to also help KBA designers produce good 
KBA systems, with enhanced user acceptance.
Keywords: Knowledge-based authentication, user evaluation, Bayesian networks, online 
social networks, security, privacy.
Introduction
Knowledge-based authentication (KBA) is a method of verifying a claimed identity through challenges 
(questions) and responses (answers), where answers are from the individual’s personal knowledge (factoids) 
and not memorized as is the case of passwords (Hastings et al. 2004; Regan 2004). A prominent example is
eBay’s consumer authentication service (CAS) (Trilli et al. 2004) which challenges users with questions 
such as: “what was your previous address/street number?” or “what are the last 4 digits of your discovery 
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card?” KBA has unique advantages over other authentication methods such as passwords and biometrics, 
especially in situations where users need to verify themselves less frequently as in credit verification or tax 
filing. But, the lack of a solid theoretical framework and rigorous mathematical definition of metrics, such 
as guessability and memorability, has hindered the universal acceptance of this convenient, low-cost, and 
unobtrusive authentication method. Chen and Liginlal (2007a; 2007b) filled this void by applying statistical 
modeling techniques, specifically Bayesian networks to KBA.
The study presented in this paper deals primarily with the behavioral and social perspectives of KBA 
motivated by the following.
1. Any security solution that fails to take human nature into account is prone to fail in practice (Sasse 
et al. 2001). For instance, digital signatures have not gained prominence not because the related 
technology is not mature enough, but because people are cognizant of the associated liabilities 
imposed by financial institutions. This argument is made from an economic perspective. Theories 
from other disciplines, especially psychology and sociology, appear to be useful in explaining 
some aspects of security, which otherwise are obscure to computer scientists. For example, the 
Wason selection task (Cosmides 1989), which is one of the cornerstones in evolutionary 
psychology, indicates that humans are more tuned to detecting cheating in social settings than with 
a formal system or through formal reasoning. This may shed light on why many technically 
sophisticated security mechanisms turn out to be ineffective in practice. Password authentication 
falls in this group.
2. In the context of KBA in particular, although our theoretical model provides mathematical 
answers to the questions such as what makes an optimal KBA system and what factoids are good 
candidates to maximize the level of assurance; there are behavioral aspects that can not be
answered directly using analytical approaches. For instance, the trade-off between security 
(difficulty of guessing) and convenience (ease of recall) from a user’s perspective, the optimal 
number of factoid challenges vis-à-vis the user’s mental effort, and innovative attacking strategies 
that have not been captured by our statistical models are questions worth examining.
Our search of the literature has revealed that there is little or no empirical study in the KBA area that 
answers such questions and our study attempts to contribute meaningfully to the research and practice in 
this area.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. First, we briefly introduce KBA and our prior research work 
on Bayesian network models, with emphasis on the accomplishments achieved. We next describe the 
research design and methodology employed in this study. Then, we present the results of our study, 
including some rather serendipitous findings about attacking strategies and the security risks associated 
with online social networks. We conclude with the limitations of this empirical study and future work.
KBA and Bayesian Network Based Models
KBA is considered convenient for both users (claimants) and verifiers (Lawler 2004). No a priori
relationship between the claimant and the verifier needs to be established specifically for the sake of 
authentication, since organizations usually acquire the knowledge about the user from previous transactions
or public data sources such as Social Security Administration (SSA) and Consumer Reporting Agency 
(CRA). These factoids are also relatively effortless to remember, compared with strong passwords (Kaliski 
2005). Moreover, KBA appears to be integral to the identity verification procedures mandated by the USA 
PATRIOT Act (2001).
A fundamental challenge in KBA research and practice is the lack of a mathematical formalism of the KBA 
problem; specifically how to quantify the level of assurance of a KBA system. To answer this question one 
needs to consider a set of systematic metrics, i.e., guessability and memorability, for the individual factoids 
and the selected factoid vector constituting a KBA system, along with a framework to unify these
Chen and Liginlal: An Empirical Investigation of Knowledge-Based Authentication
3
components and their dependency relationships. The next two subsections emphasize the significant 
findings related to Bayesian network based model of KBA with implications for this empirical study. For a 
more formal treatment of the analytical modeling work, the reader is referred to our original papers (Chen 
and Liginlal 2007a; Chen and Liginlal 2007b).
Model Selection: A Bayesian Network Model of KBA
We apply statistical modeling approach, specifically Bayesian networks (BNs) (Friedman et al. 1997) to 
KBA. From the model learning point of view, we can neither readily obtain in practice the malicious side 
of training data from the potential impostors, nor theoretically assume that the inherently unpredictable 
future attacking behaviors can be extrapolated from the past fraudulent data. This challenge precludes us 
from employing the state-of-the-art classifiers such as Support Vector Machines (SVMs) (Burges 1998). 
Instead, we adopt the generative view to model the KBA domain in order to deliver strong authentication 
systems. Formally,
Definition 1: A Bayesian network model for KBA (BN-KBA) is a six-tuple directed acyclic graph (DAG): 
),,k, x,,(KBA-BN kx
def
EEEy y= . (1)
The vertices of the DAG k) x,,(V y=  index three types of variables:
1. y  is the class variable denoting the authenticity of a claimant’s identity, with possible outcomes
}11,{   denoting }falsetrue,{ ;
2. },,,{x 21 nxxx K=  is the random vector of n selected features or factoids, with each variable 
ix denoting the correctness }wrongcorrect,{ , or the same short notation }11,{  , of a
claimant’s response to the thi factoid; and
3. },,,{k 21 mkkk K= is the random vector of knowledge sources, with each variable jk
denoting the trustworthiness }lowmedium,high,{  of the knowledge provided by the thj
source.
The edges of the DAG },,{E kx EEE y=  represent three types of dependency relationships:
1. yE  denotes the dependencies of all factoids on the class variable;
2. kE denotes the dependency edges from knowledge sources to the associated factoids; and
3. xE  denotes the interdependences among factoids.
An example of such a BN-KBA is the eBay’s CAS deployment (Trilli et al. 2004), as illustrated in Figure 1.
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Auth
{true, false}
Name
{correct, wrong}
Addr
{correct, wrong}
CreditCardNum
(CCN)
{correct, wrong}
CreditCardLimit
(CCL)
{correct, wrong}
CreditCardBal
(CCB)
{correct, wrong}
AnnGrossInc
(AGI)
{correct, wrong}
SSA
{high, med, low}
CreditBureau
(CB)
{high, med, low}
IRS
{high, med, low}
Tax
{correct,wrong}
Legend: Abbreviations and Acronyms:
Class variable y Ey Auth: Authentication
Addr: Home address or previous home address
CreditCardNum (CCN): Credit card number
Factoid variable x Ex CreditCardLimit (CCL): Credit card limit
CreditCardBal (CCB): Credit card balance
AnnGrossInc (AGI): Annual gross income
Knowledge source variable k Ek Tax: state income tax or federal tax
SSA: Social Security Administration
CreditBureau (CB): Credit Bureau
IRS: Internal Revenue Service
Figure 1. eBay’s Example of BN-KBA
The BN-KBA model essentially defines a joint probability distribution, in a compact manner, over the three 
types of variables of interest:

=
=
n
1i
ii xxppypyp ))(|()k()()kx,,( , (2)
where )( ix  denotes the set of parent nodes of ix  in the BN DAG. With a learned BN-KBA model, i.e., 
the joint distribution, we can compute the posterior probability of the class variable by Bayes’ rule:
)e(
)1()1|e()e|1(
p
ypypyp ==== , (3)
where e  denotes entered evidence regarding correctness of responses and trustworthiness of knowledge 
sources. The authentication decision is made by comparing the posterior with a predefined threshold.
The BN-KBA model is intuitively appealing in that it captures two key metrics of KBA as the model 
parameters, particularly the likelihoods:
1. Memorability: )1|1()(m def === yxpx  is the probability that a claimant with true identity 
recalls the factoid correctly.
2. Guessability: )1|1()(g def === yxpx  is the probability that an impostor correctly guesses the 
factoid. 
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To estimate the model parameters in Equation (2), we apply two distinct approaches: (1) for the prior 
probabilities, such as )(yp  and )(kp , and the memorabilities )(m x , we use the traditional statistical 
learning methods including the maximum likelihood (ML) and maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimation; 
and (2) for the guessabilities )(g x , we adopt a game-theoretic analysis since the data about attacking is 
unattainable, and derive the optimal guessability of a KBA system:
)x(max)x(*g
Ax
p

= , (4)
where x  is the vector of the selected factoids constituting a KBA system, and A denotes the set of 
possible realizations of x . In other words, a rational attacker should always try the most probable
realizations of the feature vector x . On the other hand, a secure KBA implementation should select 
factoids such that )x(max)x(*g
Ax
p

=  is minimized.
Feature Selection: A Maximum Entropy Approach
Another critical task for KBA design is to select a relevant subset of factoids to achieve the best level of 
security assurance. The challenge lies in how to measure the relevance of a factoid subset. Under an 
information-theoretic view, a population of legitimate users defines an empirical distribution over the 
selected feature space )x(p ; while an attacking strategy can be formulated as another distribution )x(q
to approximate the true distribution )x(p . A natural distance measure between these two distributions is 
the cross entropy, thus the feature selection problem can be formulated as the following optimization 
problem:
)f|,(maxarg*f
Ff
qpH

= , (5)
where f indexes the selected subset of factoids, and F  is the set of all available factoids. The closed-form 
solutions to this optimization problem lead to three feature selection criteria, at different granularity levels:
1. Domain-level feature selection is to select the optimal f  with regard to the average user identity 
id , thus to be used in all subsequent challenge-response sessions. Formally,
)f|x(maxminarg*f
AxFf
p

= . (6)
2. Identity-level feature selection is to select the optimal f  with regard to a specific id , thus to be 
adaptive to different identities under attack. Formally,
)f|x(maxarg*f id
Ff
h

= , (7)
where idx  is the vector realization of id , and )f|x( idh  is the entropy of the realization give f .
3. Factoid-level feature selection is to select the optimal f  in a stepwise manner such that the 
selection of the next factoid is based on the claimant’s responses to the previous questions, and the 
remaining selected factoids as a whole will give the lowest guessability or the maximum guessing 
entropy. Formally,
)'f,rx|'x(maxarg*'f prevprevid
'F'f
==

h , (8)
where the superscript ‘'’ stands for the remaining factoid vector to be selected, the subscript ‘prev’
denotes the previous factoids having been challenged, and r denotes the claimant’s responses.
Research Design and Methodology
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The social and behavioral space of KBA involves two stakeholders: the legitimate user and the attacker. 
From the legitimate user’s perspective, the objective of the empirical study is to gain new insights into the 
user perceptions and preferences of the goodness of a KBA design. The goodness of a KBA system is 
defined as a function of such factors as security, convenience, and privacy. For measurement purposes, we 
adopted a set of more fine-grained constructs as the antecedent variables similar to the ones proposed by
O’Gorman (2005). Table 1 shows the definitions of these variables, interpretations in the context of our 
statistical modeling approach to KBA, and their mappings into higher level categories or factors.
Table 1. Antecedent Variables of KBA Goodness
Factor Variable Definition (O'Gorman et al. 2005) Interpretation In BN-KBA
Discrimination Answers should be discriminating of a 
user.
Low guessability given a 
specific id
Obscurity Answers should not be easily guessed 
or learned.
Low guessability given an 
average id
Numerousness Questions offered for user selection 
should be fairly large in number.
Low guessability by high 
entropy
Independence Answers should be independent of each 
other.
Low dependency between 
factoids
Security
Variance Questions selected by a user should be 
dispersed in type or topic.
Low dependency between 
factoids
Convenience Recollection Answers should be consistently and 
easily recalled by a user over time. High memorability
Intimacy Questions selected by a user should not 
be considered private by that user.
Not explicitly captured in 
BN-KBAPrivacy
Anonymity Questions selected by a user should not 
discriminate that user.
Not explicitly captured in 
BN-KBA
The data collection instrument used for our study is shown in Appendix A. Eighteen students selected from 
an information security class at University of Wisconsin-Madison who had prior experience as systems 
administrators and had experience with online authentication methods, such as e-banking, participated in 
the study. The sample contained both undergraduate and graduate students. The study was conducted at the
end of the semester, thus ensuring that the participants had a sound grasp of information security topics 
including authentication.
Part I of the instrument that constitutes the exploratory part was designed to identify novel attacking 
strategies against current KBA practices. The findings from the responses were expected to have practical 
implications for KBA implementation. Parts II and III represent the confirmatory part of the study. 
Specifically, Part II was dedicated to measuring a legitimate user’s perception and preference for a KBA 
system. Each item consists of a closed-ended part and an open-ended part. By analyzing the summary 
statistics from the responses to the closed-ended questions, we tested the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis I: The BN-KBA model captures the principal components of the goodness of a 
KBA design in terms of domain-level and identity-level factoid selections.
We allowed the informants to think-aloud and coded the subjects’ responses to the open-ended questions 
into the antecedent variables listed in Table 1. We then counted the votes assigned to different facets of the 
goodness of a KBA design to gain insights into the user’s perception and preference. Technically, we 
limited the number of votes for each variable to one from each respondent in order to normalize the 
variance in answering the questions.
From the attacker’s perspective, as shown in Part III of the instrument, the objective was to examine the 
following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis II: The rational attacker represented in the BN-KBA model is a sensible 
approximation to the human attacker in terms of the way they exploit the domain factoid 
distributions and dependency knowledge.
Results
In this section, we first present the summary statistics from the confirmatory part of the study to empirically 
validate our analytical model of KBA, and then highlight the findings from the exploratory part. For each 
confirmatory item, we start with the results computationally generated by our BN-KBA model, and then 
classify the responses from the informants into the “same” and “different” categories, based on their 
conformance to the computational results.
Factoid selection from a behavioral perspective
Part II of the study was designed to provide insights into the factoid selection problem. The subjects were 
asked to select a subset of factoids that they felt provided the best level of assurance for overall KBA 
system design (domain level). They were also asked to explain the rationale behind their choices. The 
subjects, having articulated their choice for a general KBA design, were then asked to select the best 
factoids for a specific user (identity level), in this case, Alice. They were again asked to explain the 
rationale for their answers, especially the reasons for or against choosing the same set of factoids as in the 
previous question.
Given the user population in Table 5 in Appendix A and according to Equation (6), the optimal factoid 
subset by BN-KBA is: (Job, Income), (Job, Fav.Col), (Income, Fav.Col), or (Fav.Col, Zip); since their 
entropy of the most frequent realization 1.91)f|*xx( ==h is the maximum, or equivalently, the 
probability mass of the most probable realization 83)f|*xx( ==p is the minimum. However, for the 
identity Alice, the optimal factoid subset is only (Job, Income) since 3)f|xx( id ==h  is the maximum 
by applying Equation (7). We next compare the factoids selected by human subjects with the results 
generated by the computational model, as shown in the histograms plotted in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Factoid Selection: Human Subjects vs. BN-KBA
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From Figure 2, we can see that, at the domain level, 94% of the respondents selected a factoid subset 
complying with the optimal factoid selections by the BN-KBA model. The rationale behind this behavior, 
however, is more multifaceted than what has been captured in the statistical model, as elaborated shortly. 
At the identity level, only 28% of the respondents made the same factoid selection as BN-KBA would 
produce. This unexpected finding, based on our analysis of the responses to the associated open-ended
questions, is primarily due to two reasons: (1) when considering a specific identity such as Alice, people 
tend to weigh the convenience factor (ease of recall) more than they would do for protecting a population 
of users while selecting factoids; and (2) the raw fact regarding a specific identity, such as the statistics 
revealed in Table 5, is prone to be dominated by general prior knowledge in the human mind. The 
following quote from one response is a good example:
From the user’s point of view, I won’t select “Income” as a factoid as it is dynamic in 
nature and will change with time. Alice might get a raise or switch jobs or lose her job 
and she will then have to make that change in the authentication system. I would select 
job and favorite color as the two factoids for Alice as these can be most easily 
remembered.
It is interesting to investigate how the subjects made their factoid selections, since this will help examine 
the user perception, preference, and trade-off regarding the different antecedents of the goodness of a KBA 
design. Our BN-KBA model is capable of capturing the statistical structure underlying the security factor, 
which we believe is the dominant component to assess a KBA system. We report the summary statistics
analyzed from the responses to this end in Table 2, with each variable exemplified by coded field notes. We 
also plot the histogram with regard to the high-level factors in Figure 3, with the contribution of each 
variable to a factor shown as the stacked column.
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Figure 3. Histograms of the Determinants of the Goodness of KBA
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Table 2. Determinants of KBA Goodness
Factor Variable Frequency Sample Coded Field Notes
Discrimination 7
“She (Alice) is the minority on both accounts 
and thus an attacker would have the worst 
‘odds’ of guessing.[Discrimination]”
Obscurity 12 “I feel job is easy to guess and can be easily 
found out. [Obscurity]”
Numerousness 1
“However, if you are cold calling a nation wide 
business zip code can be quiet difficult to guess 
because of the number of possibilities. 
[Numerousness]”
Independence 9
“One reason would be that the two data 
(Fav.Col and Zip) are mutually independent. 
[Independence]”
Security
Variance 5
“I would choose factoids that belong to different 
domains, and that cannot be linked easily, like 
Job and Favorite Color.[Variance]”
Convenience Recollection 12
“Both of the factoids (Fav.Col and Zip) that I 
have suggested would be easily recalled by a 
user which would lead to a better accessibility to 
the system and more productive for both 
protecting and performing tasks. [Recollection]”
Intimacy 7 “...the person’s favorite color would be very 
private… [Intimacy]”Privacy
Anonymity 0
Prior knowledge Prior knowledge 2
“...red is the powerful and significant color. 
[Prior Knowledge]"; "It is plausible that given 
someone’s zip code you could guess their 
income range because sometimes only persons 
with a given income range live in a certain zip 
code. [Prior Knowledge]"; "Additionally, you 
may be able to gain their favorite color by what 
they are wearing and the color of the car they 
drive. [Prior Knowledge]”
The results shown in Table 2 and Figure 3 largely confirm Hypothesis I that our BN-KBA model captures 
the principal components of the goodness of a KBA system. Specifically, the security factor dominates 
other factors substantially. Security and convenience factors altogether account for 84% of all human 
subject votes. Within the factor of security, the most significant antecedents are obscurity, independence, 
and discrimination, in the descending order of vote frequency. These three aspects correspond to the three 
major modeling capabilities of BN-KBA, namely, domain-adaptive factoid selection, dependency modeling, 
and identity-adaptive factoid selection, respectively. It is worth noting that the variable independence is 
weighted higher than discrimination by the respondents. This can help explain the finding from the second 
question in Part II of the instrument regarding the disparity between human subjects and BN-KBA in
identity-level factoid selection, as shown in Figure 2. This also serves as a word of warning to designers of 
existing KBA implementations, which are largely based on the naïve Bayes assumption that treats factoids 
as conditionally independent of each other given the authenticity of the claimed identity (Chokhani 2004). 
Another prominent finding from this question is that convenience is ranked as one of the top antecedents 
(tied with obscurity) among all variables, even higher than privacy. This should affirm the notion that
information system security is first and foremost a social artifact and only then a technical entity; thus any 
underemphasis on the human end or skewed focus on the technical solution will not solve the security
problem as a whole.
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Rational attacker compared to human attacker
Part III of the instrument was designed such that respondents assumed the role of attacker and tried to make 
an informed guess to break into a KBA system. In the first question, respondents were asked to make a 
guess to the two challenges simultaneously; while in the second question they guessed the two factoids 
sequentially, possibly getting feedback to their first answer. For the first question, a rational attacker 
assumed by our BN-KBA model will always try (Finance, Green), since 83)rx( ==p  is the maximum
probability mass. For the second question, if the first answer “Finance” is correct, the rational attacker will 
guess the factoid “Zip” with “53706” since 54)|( 1122 === rxrxp is the maximum. Similarly, if the 
first answer is wrong, the rational attacker will guess “53719” since 32)|( 1122 == rxrxp  is the 
maximum; and if the correctness of the first answer is unknown, the rational attacker will guess “53706” 
since its marginal probability 85|)( 22 == rxp  is the maximum. The results of the guessing game are 
reported in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Attacking a KBA: Human Attackers vs. Rational Attackers
The frequency comparison shown in Figure 4 demonstrates a high degree of conformance between the 
human attacker and the rational attacker, especially when the dependency relationship is explicitly 
conveyed to the participants as in the second question. For simultaneous guessing as in the first question, 
89% of all human attackers make a rational guess, slightly lower than the case of sequential guessing. One 
possible explanation for this difference is that a significant portion (39%) of the human attackers failed to 
exploit the dependency knowledge in simultaneous guessing, as illustrated in Figure 5.
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Figure 5 Exploiting Dependency Knowledge in Simultaneous Guessing
Novel strategies and resources for attackers
The exploratory items in Part I of the instrument aim to explore novel strategies and resources to attack a 
KBA system from a more social perspective. The questions required subjects to: (1) discuss three ways an 
attacker may search for and find personally identifiable information from the World-Wide Web; (2) give 
examples of websites where specific information about commonly used factoids pertaining to a large 
number of users is available; and (3) cite specific examples of information that may be used to attack a
KBA system of a bank, assuming that the customers were likely to be profiled in the sites indicated. We 
view this item as the most serendipitous part of our exploratory study and the findings are also very 
interesting, as summarized in Tables 3 and 4, where all entries are listed in the descending order of voting 
frequency.
Table 3. Resources for Attacking KBA
Resources Frequency Website Examples
Online social networking websites 12 Facebook, MySpace, Friendster, Orkut
People search websites and online whitepages 8 USsearch, Yahoo People Search
Social engineering 6 Phone, online chat, e-mail, online survey
Search engines 6 Google, Yahoo
Personal homepages 6 Throuogh Yahoo! GeoCities
Blogs and online journals 5 Blogger, livejournal
Online government databases and websites 3 Wisconsin Circuit Court Access
University homepages 2 Faculty, graduate students, .edu
Job search websites 2 Monster, careerbuilder
Hobby and dating websites 2 Eharmony, hobbysites
Reverse phone number search websites 2 Infospace, whowhere
Credit rating agencies 1 Equifax
Family trees websites 1 Familysearch, tribalpages
Credential verification service 1 Fsmb, justifacts
Mailing lists 1 USAdata, coollist
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Table 4. Vulnerable Factoids for KBA Design
Factoid Examples Frequency
Favorite movie and TV show 12
The name of the high school mascot 7
Mother’s maiden name 6
Hometown 6
Favorite color 5
Favorite music 5
Date of birth 5
Favorite book 4
Address 4
Pet’s name 4
Place of birth 3
The street where I grew up 3
Zip code 3
The model of my first car 1
Last four digit of social security number 1
Favorite sport 1
Favorite place 1
Relationship status 1
From Table 3, we can see 67% of all respondents indicate online social networks as a resource to harvest 
information for attacking KBA. Other major resources include people or phone number search services, 
generic search engines, personal and academic homepages. The most prominent category of these resources 
refers to social computing (Schuler 1994), which encompasses online social networking, blogs, e-mail, and 
instant messaging. The security and privacy concerns raised by online social networks have begun to draw 
attention from the research community (Gross et al. 2005), but their specific implications to KBA design
are yet to be investigated. On the other hand, Table 4 can serve as a “blacklist” for KBA implementation in 
terms of factoid selection, upon further validation.
Conclusion
The study presented here is one of the first serious empirical investigations of the KBA problem, aimed to 
address questions from social and behavioral perspectives which were left unanswered by our analytical 
modeling of KBA. The contributions of our empirical study include the following:
1. We have empirically evaluated our BN-KBA model from both the legitimate user’s and the 
attacker’s perspectives. We have verified that the model has the ability to capture significant 
statistical structure underlying the KBA problem, thus making it a sensible approximation to the 
human cognitive process.
2. We have suggested other principal components that are not readily captured by a statistical model 
but worthy of formal treatment in a KBA implementation from a behavioral perspective. These 
components include convenience and privacy.
3. We have identified several novel resources, particularly online social networks, which may put 
imprudent KBA designs at risk.
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The instrument design itself, including the questionnaire and the quasi-experiment, lays groundwork for 
further research in this area. One limitation of our work is the small sample size. However, given the 
exploratory nature of the study, the findings are deemed practically significant.
We view this study as a preliminary step towards a more holistic understanding of the KBA problem, 
mainly along two directions:
1. We have developed a KBA system based on the BN-KBA model. This system will effectively 
function as a penetration testing system for organizations who want to implement their KBA 
applications in a more informed manner, by plugging their user database in the backend and 
inviting a more experienced attacker population to the front end. Such penetration testing gains 
significance in the context of the FFIEC mandates for user authentication for e-banking (FFIEC 
2007).
2. We have built a statistical model of online social networking data, to formally examine the 
associated threats to KBA systems. For example, in our experiments with a large dataset of user 
profiles (>30,000 examples) from a leading social networking site, we found that important 
personal knowledge (many of them may be used as KBA factoids) could be derived from the self-
disclosed and publicly available textual data. This model can also be used for many other critical 
tasks including: targeted marketing, collaborative filtering, background checking, and recruitment, 
to name a few.
Appendix A
Empirical Study Instrument
Part I
You are familiar with different methods of authentication. A method that is increasingly becoming popular 
is the one called knowledge-based authentication (KBA). Many online banking sites require their 
customers to enter responses to specific questions about themselves or their recent financial and other 
transactions that ordinarily only they are supposed to know.
1. Discuss three ways an attacker may search for and find personally identifiable information from 
the world-wide web (for instance, a person’s homepage contains a lot of information about the 
individual).
2. Give a good example of a website where information such as favorite pet, favorite hobby, favorite 
sports etc. about a large number of users may be found simultaneously.
3. Cite specific examples of information that may be used to attack a KBA system of a bank whose 
customers are likely to be profiled or described in a site that you identified in the previous answer.
Part II
Consider the set of information in Table 5 used to authenticate customers of a bank. There are 8 identities 
and 4 factoids. You are asked to design your KBA system so as to select only 2 factoids from among the 
four to be used for challenging and authenticating an individual.
1. Which two of the four factoids provide the best overall KBA system design in your opinion? Why 
did you select these two factoids for your design (answer based on attributes such as guessability, 
ability to recall, etc.)?
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2. Now assume that you need to specifically select two factoids that in your opinion are the best for a 
specific user-say Alice, in this case. Will you recommend the same two factoids as before? Why or 
why not? Explain.
Table 5. A Sample Population of Users of a Bank
UserID Job Income Fav.Col Zip
Bob Finance 50-100K Green 53719
Tom Finance 50-100K Green 53706
Nick Finance 100K+ Green 53706
Tina Finance 100K+ Red 53706
Rose Finance 100K+ Red 53706
Alice IT 50-100K Green 53719
Peter IT 100K+ Green 53719
Charles IT 100K+ Red 53706
Part III
Suppose you are a rational attacker (Note: to make the task nontrivial, assume that the filed UserID in 
Table 5 is anonymized).
1. You randomly try out a userid and are challenged against the factoid “Job” followed by the factoid 
“Favorite Color”. What will be your answer to the two challenges if you wish to maximize the 
chances of penetrating the user’s account?
2. Assume that the first challenge is against the factoid “Job”; your answer is “Finance”; and the 
second challenge is against the factoid “Zip”.
a. If you know that your answer to the first challenge is correct then what would be your 
response to the second challenge?
b. If you know that your answer to the first challenge is wrong, then what would be the 
answer to the second challenge?
c. If you have no knowledge about the correctness of your answer to the first challenge then 
what would be your answer to the second challenge?
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